Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing: The role of Innovation by Zhang, Xiao-Bing
 Department of Economics 
School of Business, Economics and Law at University of Gothenburg  
Vasagatan 1, PO Box 640, SE 405 30 Göteborg, Sweden  
+46 31 786 0000, +46 31 786 1326 (fax) 
www.handels.gu.se    info@handels.gu.se 
      
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS 
 
               No 589 
 
 
 
         
Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing: 
The Role of Innovation 
                
              
Xiao-Bing Zhang 
               
               
                                                                       
           
               
          
               
             April 2014                 
                  
                
  
 
                 ISSN 1403-2473 (print) 
                  ISSN 1403-2465 (online) 
Strategic Carbon Taxation and Energy Pricing:
The Role of Innovation
Xiao-Bing Zhang†
Abstract
This paper investigates the strategic interactions between carbon taxation by a
resource-consumers’ coalition and (wellhead) energy pricing by a producers’ car-
tel under possible innovation in a cheap carbon-free technology through a dy-
namic game. The arrival time of innovation is uncertain, but can be affected by
the amount spent on R&D. The results show that the expectation of possible inno-
vation decreases both the initial carbon tax and producer price, resulting in higher
initial resource extraction or carbon emissions. Even though this ’green paradox’
effect will appear in the cooperative case (no strategic interactions) as well, the
presence of strategic interactions between resource producers and consumers can
somewhat restrain such an effect. The optimal R&D to stimulate innovation is
an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration for both the resource con-
sumers and a global planner. However, the resource consumers can over-invest in
R&D (compared with the global efficient investment).
Keywords: Carbon taxation; Innovation; Uncertainty; Dynamic game
JEL Classification: C73, Q23, H21, Q54
†Department of economics, University of Gothenburg, P.O. Box 640, SE 405 30 Gothenburg, Swe-
den. Tel: +46-(0)31- 786 1348. Fax: +46-(0)31-786 1326. E-mail: xbzhmail@gmail.com; Xiao-
Bing.Zhang@economics.gu.se.
Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Jessica Coria, Thomas Sterner, Magnus Hennlock,
Andre Grimaud, Carolyn Fischer, Amrish Partel, Xiangping Liu, Efthymia Kyriakopoulou and partic-
ipants at the EAERE 2013 conference for their helpful discussions and comments on this paper. All
errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author. The research leading to these results
has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7-2007-2013) under
grant agreement n [266992] and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).
1 Introduction
The potential climate change caused by global warming has been considered as one of
the most important environmental issues in this century. Many scientists believe that
the observed temperature increase on the earth is a result of the accumulation of green-
house gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere and it can bring severe damages to the human
society and ecosystems. Mitigating climate change would require an appropriate de-
sign of climate policies, for instance, carbon taxes, to take into account the externalities
caused by GHGs emissions, which mainly come from fossil fuel consumption.
Though carbon taxes can be adopted to mitigate global warming, their usage is con-
troversial especially when the fuel prices are already high. Some people argue that
carbon taxes should be reduced in response to increased fuel prices, for the benefit of
consumers, while others believe that they should be increased further, to effectively
abate carbon emissions. The strategic interactions between the (cartelized) resource
producers and consumers make the arguments about carbon taxes more complicated.
More specifically, an energy producer such as OPEC can react strategically and pre-
empt carbon taxes by raising the producer price (Wirl, 1995). Meanwhile, a coalition
of resource-importing countries such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) could
coordinate their carbon taxation and thereby affect the pricing strategy of energy pro-
ducers. Therefore, it is of great significance to investigate climate policy issues in the
presence of this two-side strategic interaction, where the consumer side that is coordi-
nating taxation understands the effect of carbon taxes on energy prices, and the pro-
ducer side that is coordinating sales understands the effect of sales on taxation (Liski
and Tahvonen, 2004).
In addition to the strategic interaction issues, the possible innovation of low-carbon or
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carbon-free technologies can also have important implications for climate policy de-
sign and may have an effect on the strategic interactions between carbon taxation and
energy pricing. Imagine now that there is a possibility that a carbon-free technology
(which is a perfect substitute for fossil fuels) can be invented or discovered at some
time in the future and can be supplied at a lower cost (price) than that of fossil fu-
els. Since the new technology will have an effect on fossil energy consumption and
CO2 emissions, both the energy producers and the consumers need to take this into
account. Then a natural question is, how would the producers and consumers change
their strategies of energy pricing and carbon taxation with the expectation of possi-
ble innovation? How would the effect of possible innovation differ with/without the
strategic interactions between the producers’ energy pricing and and the consumers’
carbon taxation? Moreover, if the arrival time of innovation can be affected by the con-
sumers’ strategic R&D effort, how would the consumers make their R&D decisions?
How does the optimal R&D investment by the consumer side compare with the global
efficient level? To investigate these questions, this paper integrates the possible inno-
vation of a carbon-free technology into the strategic interactions between the energy
seller side and the buyer side on energy pricing and carbon taxation within a dynamic
game framework to study the role of possible innovation and R&D investment in this
strategic interaction context.
While the role that technological innovation (and its uncertainty) plays in natural re-
source extraction or climate policy design has been investigated by numerous stud-
ies, e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981), Harris and Vickers (1995), Golombek et al.
(2010), Fischer and Sterner (2012), and Henriet (2012), the strategic interactions be-
tween climate policy design and resource extraction were generally not addressed in
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these studies. On the hand, even though the strategic interactions between (fossil fuel)
producers’ energy pricing strategies and consumers’ carbon taxation have been ex-
tensively examined in the literature (for instance, Wirl, 1994, 1995; Wirl and Dockner,
1995; Tahvonen, 1994, 1996, 1997; Rubio and Escriche, 2001; Liski and Tahvonen, 2004;
Wei et al., 2012), none of the previous studies (to the best knowledge of the author) has
incorporated the possible innovation of carbon-free technologies, the uncertain arrival
time of innovation, and the endogenous R&D investment, into the investigation of
the strategic interactions on carbon taxation and energy pricing. This paper fills these
gaps in the literature.
Another concept that is related to this paper is the so-called ‘green paradox’, which
stems from Sinn (2008) and describes the situations in which some climate policies de-
signed to abate carbon emissions might actually increase carbon emissions, at least
in the short run (Hoel, 2012). For instance, a rapidly increasing carbon tax (Sinn,
2008), or the anticipation of a cheap and clean backstop technology (Henriet, 2012),
can be the possible causes of a green paradox. In line with the ‘green paradox’ argu-
ment, this study finds that the expectation of possible innovation in a cheap carbon-
free technology decreases both the initial carbon tax and initial producer price, which
implies lower initial consumer prices and thus higher initial resource extractions or
carbon emissions. Even though this effect can be found in the case without strategic
interactions as well, the decrease in initial consumer price, and thus the increase in
initial carbon emissions can be less dramatic in the presence of the strategic interac-
tions of carbon taxation and energy pricing between the energy producer side and the
consumer side, given that the environmental damage of cumulative emissions is suffi-
ciently high. This result indicates that the ‘green paradox’ effect of possible innovation
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can be somewhat restrained by the strategic interactions between resource producers
and consumers. Moreover, if the consumer side can affect the arrival time of innova-
tion through R&D, it might exert an R&D effort that is higher than the global efficient
level, provided that the environmental damage of cumulative emissions is sufficiently
high.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dynamic game
and derives the non-cooperative and cooperative strategies, respectively. The effect of
possible innovation on players’ strategies is analyzed in Section 3. In Section 4, the
hazard rate of innovation is endogenized and optimal R&D for innovation is investi-
gated. Concluding remarks and their policy implications are summarized in the final
section.
2 The dynamic game
2.1 Model setup
As in Wirl (1995), Tahvonen (1994, 1996, 1997), Rubio and Escriche (2001) and Liski
and Tahvonen (2004), there are two players in the dynamic game of strategic interac-
tions: a consumers’ coalition (such as an empowered International Energy Agency),
which maximizes the net present value of consumers’ welfare by choosing a carbon
tax τ(t); and an energy producers’ cartel (such as OPEC), which maximizes the net
present value of profits by setting the wellhead energy price (i.e., producer price) p(t).
Consequently, the consumer price at time t would be pi(t) = p(t) + τ(t), which will
determine the (non-negative) consumption for fossil energy (measured in emissions)
D(t) = a− bpi(t), where a > 0 and b > 0 are constants.
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The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere depends on the consumption of fossil
fuels. As in many other studies, such as Hoel (1993), Wirl (1995), Wirl and Dockner
(1995), Tahvonen (1996, 1997), and Rubio and Escriche (2001), this paper assumes that
the natural depreciation rate of cumulative emissions is zero, so that emissions are
irreversible (In this respect, the cumulative resource extractions are used as a proxy of
CO2 concentration):
S˙(t) = a− b(p(t) + τ(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(t)
), S(0) = S0 ≥ 0. (1)
As one can see, the dynamics of CO2 concentration will be affected by both the carbon
taxation from the consumer side and the (wellhead) energy pricing from the producer
side.
Now let us consider the possibility that a carbon-free energy technology which is a
perfect substitute for fossil fuels can be invented or discovered at some time in the
future. After the innovation or discovery, the new technology can be accessed easily at
a constant marginal cost (price) pN . It is assumed that the cost (price) of the new tech-
nology is much lower than that of the fossil energy such that there will be no demand
for (or production of) fossil fuels as soon as the innovation in this new technology is
made. However, the time of innovation (denoted as tI) is uncertain. Denote the prob-
ability that the new technology has been innovated by time t as Prob(tI < t) = H(t).
Assume for the moment that the hazard rate of the stochastic process leading to the
discovery or innovation of the technology is exogenous:
H˙(t)
1−H(t) = θ,H(0) = 0. (2)
The hazard rate θ can be thought of as the (conditional) probability that the new tech-
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nology will be innovated at time t, given that this has not happened before time t. Of
course, we have θ ≥ 0, and θ = 0 would represent the case in which no innovation
can happen, i.e., the possibility of innovation is zero. The c.d.f. (cumulative distribu-
tion function) and p.d.f (probability density function) of the random variable tI can
be obtained from (2) as H(t) = 1 − e−θt and h(t) = θe−θt, respectively. As can be
seen, parameter θ affects the probability distribution of the time for innovation. This
specification for uncertain arrival time of innovation has been employed widely in the
previous studies, e.g., Harris and Vickers (1995).
After the innovation of the carbon-free technology, there would be no further emis-
sions, thereby making the CO2 concentration constant. That is, we actually have:
S˙(t) =

a− b(p(t) + τ(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(t)
) if t < tI
0 if t ≥ tI
. (3)
Taking account of the possible innovation in the new technology, the consumers’ coali-
tion wants to maximize the present value of the net consumers’ welfare which consists
of consumers’ surplus plus carbon tax revenues minus the damage cost of climate
change, by choosing the carbon tax τ(t):
max
{τ(t)}
E
{∫ tI
0
e−rt[u(p(t) + τ(t)) + τ(t)D(p(t) + τ(t))− Ω(S(t))]dt
+
∫ ∞
tI
e−rt[u(pN)− Ω(S(t))]dt
}
,
(4)
where r is the discount rate, u(p(t) + τ(t)) = u(pi(t)) =
∫ pic
pi(t)
D(x)dx is the consumes’
surplus, where pic is the choke price which makes D(pic) = 0. With linear demand we
have pic = a
b
and thus u(p(t) + τ(t)) = 1
2
apic + 1
2
b[p(t) + τ(t)]2 − a[p(t) + τ(t)]. The term
τD(p(t) + τ(t)) in (4) represents the tax revenues and they are reimbursed to the con-
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sumers. Since these tax revenues are not taken into account by the consumers’ surplus
u(·), they are added explicitly in (4). The external cost of climate change is represented
by a quadratic damage function Ω(S(t)) = ε[S(t)]2, where ε > 0. The expectation op-
erator E{·} appears in (4) due to uncertainty about the time when the innovation of
the new technology will occur (i.e., tI). As mentioned above, the new technology can
be accessed easily at a constant marginal cost (price) pN (which is lower than that of
the fossil fules) after the occurrence of innovation, which implies that the consumers’
surplus at time t ≥ tI would be a constant u¯ = u(pN) = 12apic + 12b(pN)2 − apN . Since
there would be no further fossil energy consumption and emissions with the new tech-
nology, the CO2 concentration will keep constant after the innovation is made, as indi-
cated in (3). But there will still be instantaneous environmental damages coming from
the previous emission accumulations due to the irreversibility of emissions, as shown
in (4).
With the producers’ surplus being neglected by the consumers’ coalition, the external
cost of climate change is ignored by the energy producer’s cartel and it concentrates
only on maximizing the present value of its net profits through the (wellhead) energy
pricing strategy p(t):
max
{p(t)}
E
{∫ tI
0
e−rt[(p(t)− cS(t))D(p(t) + τ(t))]dt
}
, (5)
where c > 0 is the ratio of marginal extraction cost to cumulative extraction (the
marginal extraction cost will increase linearly with the cumulative extraction). Since
there will be no further demand for fossil fuels after the innovation is made, the pro-
ducers’ cartel will receive zero profit after the innovation time tI . Again, due the un-
certainty of innovation time, (5) comes with the expectation operator E{·}.
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As in many other related studies (e.g., Wirl, 1994; Tahvonen, 1994, 1996, 1997; Rubio
and Escriche, 2001; Liski and Tahvonen, 2004), the natural resource constraints are ig-
nored, which implies that the cumulative extractions (emissions) are not constrained
by the resource in the ground.1 The strategic interactions between a consumers’ coali-
tion and a producers’ cartel with possible innovation in a carbon-free technology is
thus modeled by a stochastic dynamic game where the time of innovation is uncer-
tain. Since there will be no more fossil energy consumption and carbon taxation after
the innovation, the game is essentially ended at a stochastic time tI when the innova-
tion of the new technology occurs.
2.2 Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
The stochastic dynamic game developed in Section 2.1 is essentially a piecewise de-
terministic differential game with two modes (regimes): mode k = 0 is active before
the innovation of the new technology and mode k = 1 becomes active after the new
technology is invented (or discovered). After the innovation, the game will stay in
mode 1; therefore, there can be at most one switch of mode in the game. The hazard
rate of switching is assumed to be exogenous at the moment (i.e., θ is considered as
an exogenous parameter in this section and the one that follows) and it will be made
endogenous in Section 4.
Compared with an open-loop Nash equilibrium, a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
would be more interesting in the context of strategic interactions since it provides
a subgame perfect equilibrium that is dynamically consistent (Rubio and Escriche,
1As stated by Wirl (2007), this assumption emphasizes that the atmosphere as sink instead of the
resources in the ground constrains fossil energy use. If fossil fuels are insufficient to raise global tem-
perature significantly, then global warming would not be a serious problem.
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2001). Define W (k, S) and V (k, S) as the current value functions for the consumers’
coalition and the producers’ cartel (respectively) in system mode k = 0, 1. The players’
Markovian strategies τ(k, S) and p(k, S) need to satisfy the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equations:
rW (0, S) = max
{τ}
{
u(p∗(0, S) + τ) + τD(p∗(0, S) + τ)− εS2
+D(p∗(0, S) + τ)WS(0, S) + θ[W (1, S)−W (0, S)] },
(6.1)
rW (1, S) = u¯− εS2, (6.2)
rV (0, S) = max
{p}
{(p− cS)D(p+ τ ∗(0, S))
+D(p+ τ ∗(0, S))VS(0, S) + θ[V (1, S)− V (0, S)] },
(6.3)
rV (1, S) = 0, (6.4)
where WS(0, S) and VS(0, S) are the first order derivatives of respective value func-
tions W (0, S) and V (0, S) with respect to the CO2 concentration level S. HJB equa-
tions (6.1) and (6.3) suggest that both players need to take into account the possibility
of innovation in the new technology for decision-making if the innovation has not
happened yet (system is in mode 0). Equation (6.2) says that the consumers’ coalition
will receive constant consumers’ surplus and suffer from (constant) instantaneous en-
vironmental damage after the occurrence of innovation. Since there is no more profits
for resource producers after the innovation, equation (6.4) holds. It should be noticed
that the carbon taxation and (wellhead) energy pricing decisions need to be made in
mode k = 0 only, i.e., before the innovation. Therefore, players’ Markovian strategies
can be denoted as τ(0, S) and p(0, S), where 0 indicates that the innovation has not yet
happened, i.e., the model system is in mode 0.
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From the first-order conditions for the maximization of the right-hand sides of the HJB
equations (6.1) and (6.3), one can get the consumers and producers’ optimal strategies:
τ(0, S) = −WS(0, S), (7.1)
p(0, S) =
1
2
[pic + cS + [WS(0, S)− VS(0, S)]] . (7.2)
Consequently one can obtain the equilibrium consumer price by summing up the car-
bon tax and energy price:
pi(0, S) =
1
2
[pic + cS − [WS(0, S) + VS(0, S)]] . (7.3)
By incorporating the optimal strategies into the HJB equations one can then obtain a
pair of differential equations for the value functions. More specifically, substitute the
optimal strategies (7.1) and (7.2) together with the value functions W (1, S) in (6.2) and
V (1, S) in (6.4) into the HJB equations (6.1) and (6.3) and eliminate the maximization.
After some calculations one can obtain the following differential equations:
(r + θ)W (0, S) =
1
8
b[pic − cS +WS(0, S) + VS(0, S)]2 − (1 + θ
r
)εS2 + θ
u¯
r
, (8.1)
(r + θ)V (0, S) =
1
4
b[pic − cS +WS(0, S) + VS(0, S)]2. (8.2)
Due to the linear-quadratic structure of the game, let us conjecture quadratic forms for
the value functions W (0, S) and V (0, S). That is:
W (0, S) = w0 + w1S +
1
2
w2S
2, V (0, S) = v0 + v1S +
1
2
v2S
2, (9)
where w0, w1, w2, v0, v1, and v2 are coefficients to be determined. Substituting (9) into
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(8.1) and (8.2) and collecting items we have:
(r + θ)[w0 + w1S +
1
2
w2S
2] =
1
8
b[pic + w1 + v1 + (w2 + v2 − c)S]2
− (1 + θ
r
)εS2 + θ
u¯
r
,
(10.1)
(r + θ)[v0 + v1S +
1
2
v2S
2] =
1
4
b[pic + w1 + v1 + (w2 + v2 − c)S]2. (10.2)
Equating the coefficients of 1, S and S2 on the two sides of (10.1) and (10.2) leads to a
equation system consisting of 6 equations. Solving the equation system for wi and vi,
i = 0, 1, 2 (one trick is to define new variables z = w2 + v2, x = w1 + v1), one can obtain
the coefficients for the value functionsW (0, S) and V (0, S), as shown in Table 1, where
z = w2 + v2 = c+
2
3b
(
r + θ −
√
(r + θ)2 + 3(r + θ)bc+ 6bε(1 + θ
r
)
)
, (11.1)
x = w1 + v1 =
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z) − pi
c, (11.2)
and one can verify that c− z > 0 and x < 0.2
Based on the value functions (9) and their coefficients in Table 1, one can obtain the
equilibrium strategies of the consumers’ coalition and the producers’ cartel as func-
tions of model parameters and CO2 concentration level by substituting the value func-
tions (9) into the equilibrium strategies (7.1) and (7.2):
τ(0, S) = −w1 − w2S, (12.1)
p(0, S) =
1
2
[pic + (w1 − v1) + [c+ (w2 − v2)]S] , (12.2)
where w1, w2, v1 and v2 are the coefficients of the value functions as in Table 1. The
2The procedure for calculating the coefficients is similar to the one that is used by Wirl and Dockner
(1995) and Rubio and Escriche (2001). Therefore, the detailed procedure is omitted. Complete compu-
tation is available upon request.
11
equilibrium consumer price can be obtained by summing up (12.1) and (12.2):
pi(0, S) = τ(0, S) + p(0, S) =
1
2
[pic − (w1 + v1) + [c− (w2 + v2)]S] . (12.3)
Table 1. Coefficients for value functions W (0, S) and V (0, S)
w0 =
b
8(r + θ)
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z)
]2
+
θu¯
r(r + θ)
v0 =
b
4(r + θ)
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z)
]2
w1 =
1
3
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z) − pi
c
]
=
1
3
x v1 =
2
3
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z) − pi
c
]
=
2
3
x
w2 =
1
3
[
z − 4ε
r
]
v2 =
2
3
[
z +
2ε
r
]
Plugging (12.3) into the differential equation (1) and solving the equation, one can find
the temporal trajectory for CO2 concentration before the innovation:
S(t) = S∞ + (S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
if t < tI , (13)
where S0 is the initial CO2 concentration (cumulative emissions) and S∞ is the long-
run CO2 concentration equilibrium or steady state for system mode 0, (i.e., before the
innovation), which can be further calculated as:
S∞ =
x+ pic
c− z =
rpic
rc+ 2ε
, (14)
where (11.1) and (11.2) are made use of for the last equality in (14). It can be seen that
the long-run CO2 concentration equilibrium S∞ is independent of θ, which implies
the that the CO2 concentration with the possibility of technological innovation (but
has not happened yet) would tend to approach the same long-run equilibrium CO2
concentration as in the case where no innovation can happen (i.e., θ = 0).3 Due to
3This is due to the fact that as time goes to infinity, the uncertainty of innovation tends to vanish.
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the assumption of irreversible emissions, it is reasonable to have S0 < S∞. Therefore,
it can be seen from (13) that the CO2 concentration (cumulative emissions) before the
occurrence of innovation (in mode 0) will increase monotonically toward the long-run
equilibrium level S∞ (recall c− z > 0).
Plugging (13) into the equilibrium strategies (12.1)-(12.3), one can obtain the temporal
trajectories of carbon tax, producer price and consumer price (before the occurrence of
innovation, i.e., in mode 0) after some calculations4:
τ(0, t) =
2picε
rc+ 2ε
− w2(S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
, (15.1)
p(0, t) =
cpicr
rc+ 2ε
+
1
2
(c+ w2 − v2)(S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
, (15.2)
pi(0, t) = pic +
1
2
(c− z)(S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
. (15.3)
It can be observed from these equations that, if the innovation has not yet happened(in
system mode 0), the equilibrium strategies of carbon taxation and (wellhead) energy
pricing would follow the paths towards long-run equilibria that are characterized by
τ∞ =
2picε
rc+ 2ε
and p∞ =
cpicr
rc+ 2ε
, respectively. The equilibrium consumer price will
approach the choke price pic in the long run, i.e., pi∞ = pic. Moreover, it is notice-
able that the long-run equilibria τ∞, p∞, and pi∞ are independent of the hazard rate
of innovation θ. This implies that, with the possibility of technological innovation
(that has not happened yet), the long-run equilibrium carbon tax, (producer) energy
price, and consumer price would be the same as those in the case without the pos-
sibility of innovation (θ = 0). It can also be observed from (15.3) that the equilib-
rium consumer price would increase monotonically over time (recall c − z > 0 and
S0 < S∞). However, how the carbon tax and producer price would evolve over time
4The calculations are omitted here to save space. Complete computation is available upon request.
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is still ambiguous. To see this, recall w2 = 13 [z − 4εr ] and v2 = 23 [z + 2εr ], where we have
z = c+ 2
3b
(
r+θ−√(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θ
r
)
)
(see (11.1)). By varying values of
c and ε, we could make w2 either negative or positive. Similarly, the sign of c+w2− v2
will also depend on the relative magnitude of c and ε (keeping other parameters con-
stant). This implies that the slopes of temporal trajectories of carbon tax and producer
price are ambiguous. However, since the consumer price is increasing, we know that
at least one of the two (carbon tax or producer price) needs to be increasing over time.
That is, only three cases are possible: (i) increasing carbon tax and decreasing producer
price; (ii) decreasing carbon tax and increasing producer price; (iii) both the carbon tax
and producer price are increasing. An economic interpretation for this can be stated
in terms of whether the increase in extraction cost dominates the increase in environ-
mental damages, or the other way around (Wirl 1995; Rubio and Escriche, 2001). For
instance, if the environmental damage is high enough, we will have increasing carbon
tax and decreasing producer/wellhead price (it can be verified that w2 → −∞ and
c+w2−v2 → −∞ if ε→ +∞, where it should be kept in mind that the order of infinity
will be lowered by a square root).
2.3 Cooperative strategies
The Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium obtained above is based on the assumption that
the two players have conflicting objectives: the consumers’ coalition cares about the
consumers’ welfare and damage of climate change while the producers’ cartel cares
only about the profits from resource extraction. In this section, the cooperative so-
lution, i.e., the global efficient strategy, for the dynamic game will be calculated and
investigated. As stated by Wirl (1995), this efficient strategy can serve as the bench-
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mark and provide more insights into the strategic interaction issues by comparing
the global efficient solution with the non-cooperative solution (Markov-perfect Nash
equilibrium).
It should be noticed that, in the cooperative case, the consumers’ welfare and the pro-
ducers’ profits needs to be added together to account for the global welfare. That is:
E
{∫ tI
0
e−rt[u(p(t) + τ(t)) + (p(t) + τ(t)− cS(t))D(p(t) + τ(t))− Ω(S(t))]dt
+
∫ ∞
tI
e−rt[u(pN)− Ω(S(t))]dt
}
.
(16)
In the cooperative case, the maximization of global welfare (16) is by definition the
same for consumers’ coalition and producers’ cartel so that the split of the consumer
price pi into a producer price p and the carbon tax τ is indefinite, thereby making the
final consumer price pi become the only decision variable in the maximization of (16)
(i.e., p(t) + τ(t) can be replaced by pi(t) in (16)):
max
{pi(t)}
E
{∫ tI
0
e−rt[u(pi(t)) + (pi(t)− cS(t))D(pi(t))− Ω(S(t))]dt
+
∫ ∞
tI
e−rt[u(pN)− Ω(S(t))]dt
}
.
(17)
Similar to the non-cooperative case in Section 2.2, define M(k, S) as the current value
functions for the global planner associated with (17) in system mode k. Then the global
efficient/optimal strategy needs to satisfy the following HJB equations:
rM(0, S) = max
{pi}
{
u(pi) + (pi − cS)D(pi)− εS2 +D(pi)MS(0, S)
+θ[M(1, S)−M(0, S)]} ,
(18.1)
rM(1, S) =u¯− εS2, (18.2)
where MS(0, S) is the first order derivative of value function M(0, S) with respect to
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the CO2 concentration S.
The first-order condition for the maximization of the right-hand sides of the HJB equa-
tions (18.1) gives the global efficient strategy:
piG(0, S) = −MS(0, S) + cS. (19)
Substitute the optimal strategy (19) and the value functions M(1, S) from (18.2) into
the HJB equations (18.1), eliminate the maximization, and, after some calculations, we
have
(r + θ)M(0, S) =
1
2
b[pic − cS +MS(0, S)]2 − (1 + θ
r
)εS2 + θ
u¯
r
. (20)
Conjecture quadratic value function
M(0, S) = m0 +m1S +
1
2
m2S
2, (21)
where m0, m1, and m2 are coefficients that need to be determined. Substituting (21)
into (20) and collecting items, we have:
(r + θ)[m0 +m1S +
1
2
m2S
2] =
1
2
b [pic +m1 + (m2 − c)S]2 − (1 + θ
r
)εS2 + θ
u¯
r
. (22)
Equating the coefficients of 1, S, and S2 on the two sides of (22) and solving for m0,
m1, and m2, one can obtain the coefficients for the value function M(0, S), as shown in
Table 2.5 It can be verified that c−m2 > 0.
Substituting the value functions (21) with the calculated coefficients, one can obtain
the global efficient strategy as a function of model parameters and CO2 concentration
5We have omitted the detailed calculations. They are available from the author upon request.
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level:
piG(0, S) = (c−m2)S −m1, (23)
where m1and m2are the coefficients of the value functions as in Table 2. Plugging
(23) into the differential equation (1) and solving the equation, one can get the explicit
solution:
SG(t) = SG∞ + (S0 − SG∞) exp {−b(c−m2)t} if t < tI , (24)
where S0 is the initial CO2 concentration (cumulative emissions) and SG∞ =
pic +m1
c−m2 =
rpic
rc+ 2ε
is the long-run CO2 concentration equilibrium or steady state for system mode
0, i.e., before the innovation.
Table 2. Coefficients for value function M(0, S)
m0 =
b
2(r + θ)
[
(r + θ)pic
(r + θ) + b(c−m2)
]2
+
θu¯
r(r + θ)
m1 =
(r + θ)pic
(r + θ) + b(c−m2) − pi
c
m2 = c+
1
2b
(
r + θ −
√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θ
r
)
)
It can be noticed that the long-run CO2 concentration equilibrium in the cooperative
case is the same as that in the non-cooperative case, i.e., SG∞ = S∞. Similar to the
non-cooperative case, the long-run CO2 concentration SG∞ is also independent of θ,
the hazard rate of innovation. Besides, one can see from (24) that the CO2 concen-
tration under the global efficient strategy will also increase monotonically before the
occurrence of innovation (in mode 0) toward the long-run equilibrium level SG∞ (recall
c−m2 > 0).
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Plugging (24) into (23), one can obtain the temporal trajectory of the global efficient
strategy (before the occurrence of innovation, i.e., in mode 0) after some calculations:
piG(0, t) = pic + (c−m2)(S0 − SG∞) exp {−b(c−m2)t} . (25)
It can also be observed from (25) that the equilibrium consumer price in the coopera-
tive case would also increase monotonically over time (since c−m2 > 0 and S0 < SG∞).
2.4 Comparison of the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions
While the global efficient strategy serves as a benchmark or first-best solution for the
global warming problem, the non-cooperative solution reflects the effect of strategic
interactions between the consumers’ coalition and the producers’ cartel. Therefore, it
would be of interest to compare the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. Specif-
ically, by comparing the consumer price in the cooperative case with that in the non-
cooperative case, one can find the result summarized in Proposition 1
Proposition 1 The consumer price in the global efficient solution has a lower initial value
than that in the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Recall from (15.3) and (25) that the temporal trajectories of consumer prices in
the cooperative and non-cooperative cases are, respectively:
piG(0, t) = pic + (c−m2)(S0 − SG∞) exp {−b(c−m2)t} ,
pi(0, t) = pic +
1
2
(c− z)(S0 − S∞) exp {−1
2
b(c− z)t} .
Note that the initial consumer prices in the two cases are, respectively:
piG(0, 0) = pic + (c−m2)(S0 − SG∞),
18
pi(0, 0) = pic +
1
2
(c− z)(S0 − S∞),
where we have (from (11.1) and Table 2)
1
2
(c− z) = − 1
3b
(
r + θ −
√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θ
r
)
)
,
c−m2 = − 1
2b
(
r + θ −
√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θ
r
)
)
.
As mentioned before, both 1
2
(c − z) and c −m2 are positive. If we can know the sign
of (c−m2)− 12(c− z), we can say something about the comparison of initial consumer
prices in the cooperative and non-cooperative cases. Since we have
(c−m2)− 1
2
(c− z) = − 1
6b
(r + θ) +
1
2b
√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θ
r
)
− 1
3b
√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θ
r
)
and we know
√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θ
r
) >
√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θ
r
),
this implies (c−m2)− 12(c−z) > − 16b(r+θ)+ 16b
√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θ
r
) > 0.
Therefore, we have: piG(0, 0) < pi(0, 0), i.e., the initial consumer price is lower for the
cooperative case.
This implies that the strategic interaction or rent contest between the consumers’ coali-
tion and the producers’ cartel will decrease the initial fossil fuel consumption, com-
pared with the case when they are cooperating with each other. However, it should
be noticed that consumer prices in both the competitive and cooperative cases will
approach the same steady level pic in system mode k = 0, as indicated by (15.3) and
(25).
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3 The effect of possible innovation
Based on the game’s cooperative and non-cooperative solutions obtained above, one
can analyze the effect of possible innovation on both solutions by comparing the case
with a positive θ (with possible innovation) and the case of θ = 0 (with no innovation).
It should be noticed that since the dynamic game is essentially ended after the inno-
vation, the analysis will be concentrated on the effect of possible innovation in system
mode k = 0, in which the innovation has not yet happened but the players expect that
it can happen sometime in the future.
3.1 Effect of possible innovation on the Markov-perfect Nash equi-
librium
To see the effect of possible innovation on the non-cooperative strategies, let us take
the derivatives of (15.1)-(15.3) with respect to the hazard rate of innovation θ. After
some calculations one can obtain:
∂τ(0, t)
∂θ
= −1
6
∂z
∂θ
(2 + 3bw2t)(S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
, (26.1)
∂p(0, t)
∂θ
= − 1
12
∂z
∂θ
[2− 3b(c+ w2 − v2)t] (S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
, (26.2)
∂pi(0, t)
∂θ
= −1
4
∂z
∂θ
[2− b(c− z)t](S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
. (26.3)
First, let us find out how the possible innovation will affect the initial carbon tax, pro-
ducer price and consumer price. The results are summarized in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2 The possible innovation in the new technology will lead to a lower initial car-
bon tax and producer price, thereby resulting in a lower initial consumer price.
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Proof. By substituting t = 0 into (26.1)-(26.3), one can obtain the marginal effect of
innovation hazard rate on the initial values of carbon tax, fuel price, and consumer
price:
∂τ(0, 0)
∂θ
= −1
3
∂z
∂θ
(S0 − S∞), (27.1)
∂p(0, 0)
∂θ
= −1
6
∂z
∂θ
(S0 − S∞), (27.2)
∂pi(0, 0)
∂θ
= −1
2
∂z
∂θ
(S0 − S∞). (27.3)
Since S0 < S∞, one can identify the signs of (27.1)-(27.3) if the sign of ∂z∂θ is known. It
has been shown in Appendix A1 ∂z
∂θ
< 0 for all θ ≥ 0. Thus, we have ∂τ(0,0)
∂θ
< 0, ∂p(0,0)
∂θ
<
0, and ∂pi(0,0)
∂θ
< 0, which implies τ(0, 0)|θ>0 < τ(0, 0)|θ=0, p(0, 0)|θ>0 < p(0, 0)|θ=0 and
pi(0, 0)|θ>0 < pi(0, 0)|θ=0. That is, the anticipation of possible innovation will lower the
initial carbon taxation, fuel price, and consumer price.
This result suggests that the possibility of innovation will stimulate a higher initial
demand for fossil fuels, and thus higher initial emissions. With the expectation that
the innovation of a carbon-free technology can happen and will relieve the concerns
about environmental damage, the consumers’ coalition lowers the initial carbon tax.
Being aware that occurrence of innovation would lead to zero demand for the fossil
energy, the producers’ cartel also would like to lower the initial (wellhead) energy
price to stimulate the consumption of fossil fuels. Consequently, the initial consumer
price is lower as a result of the reduced carbon tax and producer price, and this leads
to a higher initial demand for fossil fuels and higher initial CO2 emissions.
As can be seen in (15.1)-(15.3), due to the uncertainty about the time of innovation, a
positive probability of innovation (θ > 0) will not change the long-run equilibrium of
carbon tax, producer price and consumer price before the innovation (i.e., in system
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mode k = 0). However, the possible innovation will affect the transitional dynamics
of these variables in addition to their initial values. If we denote the case with possible
innovation (θ > 0) as case WPI and the case with no innovation (θ = 0) as case WNI ,
respectively, then the following proposition can be established and demonstrated.
Proposition 3 Provided that the model system is in mode k = 0, we have the following state-
ments: (i) The consumer price in WPI is first below, but later above the consumer price in
WNI; (ii) If the environmental damage is sufficiently high, the carbon tax in WPI will be first
lower, but later higher than the carbon tax in WNI; (iii) The producer price in WPI will always
be lower than that in WNI, if the environmental damage is high enough.
Proof. Recall from (26.3) that the derivative of consumer price (in mode 0) w.r.t. the
hazard rate of innovation is calculated as:
∂pi(0, t)
∂θ
= −1
4
∂z
∂θ
[2− b(c− z)t](S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
.
It has been shown in Proposition 2 that, for t = 0, the effect of innovation possibility
on the consumer price (i.e.,∂pi(0,0)
∂θ
) is negative. For t 6= 0, since c− z > 0, we can find a
t∗ > 0 to make 2 − b(c − z)t∗ = 0. Recall that ∂z
∂θ
< 0(see Appendix A1), and thus we
have ∂pi(0,t)
∂θ
< 0 for 0 ≤ t < t∗ and ∂pi(0,t)
∂θ
> 0 for t > t∗. This implies that, for 0 ≤ t < t∗,
the consumer price with the expectation of possible innovation would be lower than
that in the case without such an expectation (i.e., pi(0, t)|θ>0 < pi(0, t)|θ=0) , whereas for
t > t∗ the relationship is the contrary. Figure 1(a) illustrates this result.
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Figure 1. Temporary trajectories for players’ strategies with/without the innovation possibility
Similarly, for the carbon tax we have from (26.1) that:
∂τ(0, t)
∂θ
= −1
6
∂z
∂θ
(2 + 3w2bt)(S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
.
Since ∂z
∂ε
=
−2(1+ θ
r
)√
(r+θ)2+3bc(r+θ)+6bε(1+ θ
r
)
< 0 and w2 = 13
[
z − 4ε
r
]
, we have ∂w2
∂ε
= 1
3
[∂z
∂ε
− 4
r
] <
0. Besides, it can be found that z → −∞, thus w2 → −∞ if ε → +∞. That is, if the
environmental damage ε is high enough, we have w2 < 0, which implies that we can
find a t∗∗ > 0 which satisfies 2 + 3w2bt∗∗ = 0. Thus we have
∂τ(0,t)
∂θ
< 0 for 0 ≤ t < t∗∗
and ∂τ(0,t)
∂θ
> 0 for t > t∗∗, which implies τ(0, t)|θ>0 < τ(0, t)|θ=0 for 0 ≤ t < t∗∗ and
τ(0, t)|θ>0 > τ(0, t)|θ=0 for t > t∗∗. Therefore, if the environmental damage is high
enough, the carbon tax with possible innovation will be first below, but later above,
the carbon tax in the case with no innovation, as illustrated in Figure 1(b).
As for the producer price, we have from (26.2) that:
∂p(0, t)
∂θ
= − 1
12
∂z
∂θ
[2− 3b(c+ w2 − v2)t] (S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
.
Recall from Table 1 that w2 − v2 = −13 [z + 8εr ]. If ε → +∞, we have z → −∞ and
8ε
r
→ +∞. However, the order of infinity is lower for z because of the square root.
Therefore, we have z + 8ε
r
→ +∞, and thus w2 − v2 → −∞, if ε → +∞. That is, if the
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environmental damage ε is high enough, we can have c + w2 − v2 < 0, which implies
that we will have [2 − 3b(c + w2 − v2)t] > 0 and thus ∂p(0,t)∂θ < 0 for all t ≥ 0. That is,
if the environmental damage is high enough, the producer price with the expectation
of possible innovation will be lower than that in the case without such an expectation
(i.e., p(0, t)|θ>0 < p(0, t)|θ=0) before the producer price for the two cases converge to the
same long-run equilibrium (recall p∞ is independent of the hazard rate of innovation
θ). Figure 1(c) provides an illustration.
These results are reflective of the fact that the CO2 concentration in both cases (namely,
case WPI with mode 0, and case WNI) will converge to the same long-run equilibrium
level, which implies that the total amount of fossil energy consumed in both cases is
the same and the area under the temporal path of fossil energy demand should also
be the same. This implies that the area under the temporal path of the consumer price
(which determines the fossil energy demand) would be the same for both cases as well.
Since we have shown in Proposition 2 that the initial consumer price will be lower with
the possible innovation (compared with the case of no innovation), the temporal paths
of the consumer price in the two cases need to intersect to get the same area under the
temporal path. The monotonic property of consumer price implies that the paths in
the two cases intersect only one.
As mentioned above in Section 2, with strategic interactions between energy con-
sumers and producers, the carbon tax will be increasing over time and the (wellhead)
fuel price will be decreasing if the environmental damage is sufficiently high. Given
that the consumer price is always increasing over time, the proportion of (wellhead)
fuel price in the consumer price would be decreasing if the damage is high enough,
which implies that, if the environmental damage is sufficiently high, the temporal tra-
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jectory of consumer price will depend mainly on that of the carbon tax. Therefore,
the temporal paths of the carbon taxes need to intersect such that the temporal paths
of the consumer price can intersect. Since the initial carbon tax is lower for the case
with possible innovation than the case without, as shown in Proposition 2, we will see
that the carbon tax with the expectation of possible innovation would be first below,
but later above, the carbon tax without such an expectation. The intersection of the
temporary paths for carbon taxes and the decreasing proportion of producer price in
the consumer price can leave room for the (wellhead) fuel price in the two cases (with
and without possible innovation) not to intersect.
It should be emphasized that Proposition 3 is established based on the underlying
assumption that the model system is still in mode 0, i.e., even though the innovation
can happen (in the case of θ > 0), it has not happened yet. Since the time of innovation
is uncertain, it can happen at any time. If the innovation occurs at some time that
is earlier than the critical time t∗ or t∗∗, the conclusions in Proposition 3 should be
modified accordingly, given that the occurrence of innovation will bring cheap non-
polluting technology. For instance, if the innovation time tI < t∗∗, the carbon tax in the
case of θ > 0 may not have the chance to be higher than that in the case of θ = 0, given
that carbon tax will be zero after the innovation.
One of the implications from Proposition 3 is that the fossil fuel demand (thus CO2
emissions) in the case with possible innovation will be first above, but later below,
the demand (and thus emissions) in the case with no innovation. Since the temporal
paths of CO2 concentration (cumulative emissions) in both cases are monotonically
increasing over time and have the same initial and long-run equilibrium level (recall
that S∞ is independent of θ), one can expect that the CO2 concentration level in the
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case with the expectation of possible innovation will be above the concentration level
in the case without such an expectation for any instant of time t ∈ (0, tI), as formally
demonstrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For any instant of time t ∈ (0, tI), the CO2 concentration with the expectation
of possible innovation is higher than that in the case without such an expectation.
Proof. Recall that the evolution of CO2 concentration level (before the occurrence of
innovation) along the equilibrium path is characterized by (13):
S(t) = S∞ + (S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
if t < tI ,
where S∞ =
rpic
rc+ 2ε
is the long-run equilibrium concentration level (in mode 0). As
claimed in Section 2, since S∞ is independent of the hazard rate of innovation θ, the
long-run equilibrium CO2 concentration level with the possibility of innovation will
be the same as that in the case where there is no possibility of innovation.
However, the possible innovation will have an effect on the temporal trajectory of
CO2 concentration (from the initial level) to reach the long-run equilibrium level. To
see this, take the derivatives of the S(t) with respect to the hazard rate of innovation θ
and one can obtain:
∂S(t)
∂θ
= (S0 − S∞) exp
{
−1
2
b(c− z)t
}
(
1
2
b
∂z
∂θ
t) if t < tI .
Given S0 < S∞ and the negative sign of
∂z
∂θ (see Appendix A1), one can know that
∂S(t)
∂θ
> 0 will hold for any instant of time t ∈ (0, tI), which implies S(t)|θ>0 > S(t)|θ=0
for t ∈ (0, tI). That is, for t ∈ (0, tI), the CO2 concentration in the case with possible
innovation will be higher than that in the case with no innovation.
This result suggests that the expectation of possible innovation will lead to a higher
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transitional CO2 concentration before the innovation, which reflects the fact that the
fossil fuel demand in early days is higher in the case with possible innovation, com-
pared with the case with no innovation. In this respect, the possible innovation plays a
role similar to that of a larger discount rate in the consumption of fossil fuels: consume
more in the early days and less in the latter days.
3.2 Effect of possible innovation on the global efficient strategy
In addition to the effect of possible innovation on the non-cooperative solution, one
would also like to see the effect of innovation in the case of cooperation between the
two players. To see this, one can calculate the derivatives of global efficient strategy
(25) with respect to the hazard rate of innovation θ as:
∂piG(0, t)
∂θ
= −∂m2
∂θ
[1− b(c−m2)t](S0 − S∞) exp {−b(c−m2)t} , (28.1)
where we made use of the fact SG∞ = S∞. For t = 0, we have
∂piG(0, 0)
∂θ
= −∂m2
∂θ
(S0 − S∞). (28.2)
In Appendix B1, we show that ∂m2
∂θ
< 0 for all θ ≥ 0. Therefore, given S0 < S∞ we have
∂piG(0,0)
∂θ
< 0 for θ ≥ 0, which implies that piG(0, 0)|θ>0 < piG(0, 0)|θ=0. That is, a positive
probability of innovation will lower the initial consumer price in the global efficient
solution as well, which is consistent with the effect of innovation in the Markov-perfect
Nash equilibrium summarized in Proposition 2.
For t 6= 0, since c − m2 > 0, similar arguments in Proposition 3 can be applied here.
That is, we can find a t∗∗∗ > 0 to make 1 − b(c −m2)t∗∗∗ = 0. Recall that ∂m2∂θ < 0 (see
Appendix B1), and thus we have ∂pi
G(0,t)
∂θ
< 0 for 0 ≤ t < t∗∗∗ and ∂piG(0,t)
∂θ
> 0 for t >
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t∗∗∗, which implies that, similar to the non-cooperative solution, the consumer price in
the cooperative solution would also be lower with possible innovation (that has not
happened yet) than in the case with no innovation (i.e., piG(0, t)|θ>0 < piG(0, t)|θ=0) for
0 ≤ t < t∗∗∗, whereas the relationship is the contrary for t ≥ t∗∗∗.
As for the effect of innovation on the dynamics of CO2 concentration in the cooperative
case, since we have: SG(t) = S∞ + (S0 − S∞) exp {−b(c−m2)t} if t < tI (see (24) and
note that SG∞ = S∞), we can get:
∂SG(t)
∂θ
= (S0 − S∞) exp {−b(c−m2)t} (b∂m2
∂θ
t) if t < tI . (28.3)
Given S0 < S∞ and the negative sign of ∂m2∂θ (see Appendix B1), one can know from
(28.3) that ∂S
G(t)
∂θ
> 0 will hold for any t ∈ (0, tI), which implies that SG(t)|θ>0 >
SG(t)|θ=0 will hold for t ∈ (0, tI). That is, in the cooperative case, the possibility of
innovation will also lead to a higher transitional CO2 concentration.
Therefore, it can be seen that the effect of possible innovation in the cooperative case is
consistent with that in the non-cooperative case. That is, the possibility of innovation
will lower the initial consumer price. And the consumer price with the expectation
of possible innovation (that has not happened yet) will first be lower but later higher
than the consumer price without the possibility of innovation.
3.3 Comparison of effects in the two cases
The result that the possible innovation will lower the initial consumer price in both the
non-cooperative case and the cooperative case implies that the expectation of possible
innovation will stimulate higher near-term fossil fuel consumption, and thus higher
near-term CO2 emissions, no matter whether the fossil-fuel consuming countries com-
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pete or cooperate with the producing countries. But will the magnitude of such an
effect be different in the two (cooperative and non-cooperative) cases? To investigate
this question, some further calculations are necessary.
By comparing (28.2) with (26.3), we have:
∂piG(0, 0)
∂θ
− ∂pi(0, 0)
∂θ
=
(
1
2
∂z
∂θ
− ∂m2
∂θ
)
(S0 − S∞), (29)
Based on the expressions for ∂z
∂θ
and ∂m2
∂θ
, it is not difficult to show that, as ε → +∞,
we have 1
2
∂z
∂θ
− ∂m2
∂θ
→ √ε · sign
(
b
r
√
2b(1+ θ
r
)
− b
r
√
6b(1+ θ
r
)
)
→ +∞. This implies that, if
the environment damage is high enough, we can get 1
2
∂z
∂θ
− ∂m2
∂θ
> 0, thereby making
∂piG(0,0)
∂θ
− ∂pi(0,0)
∂θ
< 0. Together with the above-demonstrated results ∂pi
G(0,0)
∂θ
< 0 and
∂pi(0,0)
∂θ
< 0, we know that the decrease in the initial consumer price due to the pos-
sible innovation is more remarkable in the cooperative case, which implies that the
increase in the initial fossil fuel consumption (or equivalently, initial CO2 emissions)
as a response to the possible innovation can be more dramatic in the global efficient so-
lution than that in the Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium, if the environment damage
is sufficiently high.
The increase in the initial emissions due to the possible innovation in cheap carbon-
free technology is consistent with the ‘green paradox’ argument in the literature. That
is, some climate policies designed to abate carbon emissions might actually increase
the emissions, at least in the short run. The results here suggest that even though this
‘green paradox’ effect of possible innovation can be found both in the non-cooperative
case where strategic interaction issues exist and in the cooperative case where strategic
interactions do not exist, the increase in initial carbon emissions can be less remarkable
in the presence of strategic interactions of carbon taxation and energy pricing between
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the energy producer side and the consumer side, given that the environmental dam-
age of cumulative emissions is sufficiently high. This result indicates that the ‘green
paradox’ effect of possible innovation can be somewhat restrained by the presence of
strategic interactions (rent contest) between resource producers and consumers.
4 Optimal R&D investment
4.1 R&D investment by the consumers
The hazard rate for the innovation of a carbon-free technology to occur at a particu-
lar time is exogenously given in the previous sections. In reality, the probability of
technology breakthroughs will depend on the R&D efforts of players. Given that the
new technology (cheap and clean) will eat the profits of producers, it is reasonable to
assume that only the consumer side will make an effort in the R&D of this new tech-
nology. Therefore, in this section, the consumers’ coalition is allowed to affect the time
of innovation by investing in R&D starting from time 0, thereby making the hazard
rate of innovation θ a function of the consumer coalition’s R&D effort, y. The instan-
taneous cost of R&D effort is denoted as C(y). To make things simple, let us assume
θ(y) ≡ y and C(y) ≡ y2.6
At time 0, the consumers’ coalition will choose the optimal R&D effort to maximize its
(expected) welfare, taking into account the cost of R&D efforts:
max
y≥0
W (0, S0, y)−
∫ +∞
0
e−rt[
∫ +∞
t
h(tI)dtI ]C(y)dt, (30)
where W (0, S0, y) is the value function for the consumers’ coalition (evaluated at ini-
6This assumption is not uncommon in the literature; see e.g., Bahel (2011).
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tial CO2 concentration S(0) = S0) obtained in Section 2.2, which is a function of the
hazard rate of innovation θand thus a function of the R&D efforty (since θ ≡ y), and
tI is the instant of time at which the innovation is made. Since tI is random, one
needs to consider the probability that the innovation has not been made by a spacific
instant of time (after the innovation, there is no need to undertake R&D any more).∫ +∞
t
h(tI)dI = 1−H(t) = e−yt is the probability that the innovation has not been made
by time t.
∫ +∞
0
e−rt[
∫ +∞
t
h(tI)dtI ]C(y)dt is thus the total expected effort cost for R&D
investment (which has been discounted to time t = 0). By integration, one can further
find that
∫ +∞
0
e−rt[
∫ +∞
t
h(tI)dtI ]C(y)dt =
y2
r + y
.
The first order condition (interior solution) for the maximization problem (30) is:
∂W (0, S0, y)
∂y
=
y2 + 2ry
(r + y)2
. (31)
The left-hand side of (31) is the marginal benefit of R&D effort and the right-hand
side is the marginal cost. It should be noted that the marginal cost of R&D effort at
y = 0 is equal to zero (i.e., y
2+2ry
(r+y)2
∣∣∣
y=0
= 0). Therefore, if the marginal benefit at y = 0
is greater than zero (i.e., ∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
|y=0 > 0), one can conclude that (with the satisfied
second-order condition) a positive R&D effort is worth exerting by the consumers’
coalition.
Based on the value function for the consumers’ coalition (evaluated at the initial con-
centration level S0) W (0, S0) = w0 + w1S0 + 12w2[S0]
2, where w0, w1 and w2 are func-
tions of θ (thus functions of R&D efforty) as in Table 1, we can obtain∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
|y=0 =
∂w0(y=0)
∂y
+ ∂w1(y=0)
∂y
S0+
1
2
∂w2(y=0)
∂y
[S0]
2. Since ∂z(θ=0)
∂θ
< 0 (see Appendix A1) and ∂x(θ=0)
∂θ
> 0
(see Appendix A2), one can have the following judgement based on expressions for w2
andw1 in Table 1:
∂w2(y=0)
∂y
= 1
3
∂z(y=0)
∂y
< 0 and ∂w1(y=0)
∂y
= 1
3
∂x(y=0)
∂y
> 0 (remember θ ≡ y).
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Furthermore, it can be found from the expression for w0 in Table 1 (making use of
x = 4rpi
c
4r+3b(c−z) − pic and θ ≡ y) that:
∂w0(y = 0)
∂y
= − b
8r2
[
4rpic
4r + 3b(c− z|y=0)
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
b
4r
[
4rpic
4r + 3b(c− z|y=0)
]
∂x(y = 0)
∂y︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
u¯
r2︸︷︷︸
>0
> − b
8r2
[
4rpic
4r + 3b(c− z|y=0)
]2
+
u¯
r2
> − b
8r2
(pic)2 +
u¯
r2
.
Recall that u¯ = 1
2
apic + 1
2
b(pN)
2 − apN , and we have u¯→ 12apic if pN → 0, which implies
that if pN → 0, then− b8r2 (pic)2 + u¯r2 → − a8r2pic + a2r2pic = 3a8r2pic. Consequently, one
knows that ∂w0(y=0)
∂y
> 0 if pN → 0. That is, if the carbon-free technology is sufficiently
cheap, we have ∂w0(y=0)
∂y
> 0. Besides, one can easily verify that lim
y→+∞
∂z
∂y
= 0 (thus
lim
y→+∞
∂w2
∂y
= 0), lim
y→+∞
∂x
∂y
= 0 (thus lim
y→+∞
∂w1
∂y
= 0), and lim
y→+∞
∂w0
∂y
= 0, which implies
that lim
y→+∞
∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
= 0. Based on these calculations, the following proposition can be
established and demonstrated.
Proposition 5 With a sufficiently low price for the new carbon-free technology, it would be
in the best interest of the consumers’ coalition to exert a positive R&D effort on the new tech-
nology for any initial CO2 concentration 0 ≤ S0 < S∞. The optimal R&D effort y∗ is an
increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration level: the higher the initial CO2 concen-
tration level, the greater the optimal R&D effort.
Proof. As mentioned above, the marginal benefit of R&D effort by the consumers’
coalition (evaluated at zero effort) is given by:
∂W (0, S0, y)
∂y
|y=0 = ∂w0(y = 0)
∂y
+
∂w1(y = 0)
∂y
S0 +
1
2
∂w2(y = 0)
∂y
[S0]
2,
where S0 is the initial CO2 concentration level.
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One can further find that ∂
2W (0,S0,y)
∂y∂S0
|y=0 = ∂w1(y=0)∂y + ∂w2(y=0)∂y S0. It is shown in Appendix
A3 that ∂
2W (0,S0,y)
∂y∂S0
|y=0 > 0 holds for all 0 ≤ S0 < S∞, which implies that ∂W (0,S0,y)∂y |y=0
is an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentration levelS0 for 0 ≤ S0 < S∞. It
has been shown that, with a sufficiently low price for the new technology, we have
∂w0(y=0)
∂y
> 0. Given that ∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
|y=0 is an increasing function of S0 for 0 ≤ S0 < S∞ ,
we have ∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
|y=0 ≥ ∂W (0,S0,y)∂y |y=0,S0=0 = ∂w0(y=0)∂y , thereby making ∂W (0,S0,y)∂y |y=0 > 0
hold for any initial CO2 concentration 0 ≤ S0 < S∞, which implies that, if the price for
the new technology is sufficiently low, the marginal benefit of R&D effort evaluated at
zero effort would be always positive.
Recall that the marginal cost of R&D effort at y = 0 is zero (i.e., y
2+2ry
(r+y)2
∣∣∣
y=0
= 0). There-
fore, with a sufficiently low price for the new technology, the marginal benefit of R&D
effort is greater than it marginal cost at y = 0. However, if y → +∞, the marginal
benefit of R&D effort is lower than the marginal cost (recall that lim
y→+∞
∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
= 0).
Therefore, continuity requires that there exists a y∗ > 0, such that the first order con-
dition (31) holds and the second order condition for maximization is satisfied. This
implies that it is in the best interest of the consumers’ coalition to exert a positive R&D
effort for any initial CO2 concentration level 0 ≤ S0 < S∞.
It can also be shown that the optimal R&D effort that the consumers’ coalition should
exert for inventing the new technology is closely related to the initial CO2 concen-
tration level. More specifically, recall from (31) that the first order condition for op-
timal R&D effort y∗is ∂W (0,S0,y
∗)
∂y∗ − (y
∗)2+2ry∗
(r+y∗)2 = 0, which defines an implicit function
G(S0, y
∗) = 0. The second-order condition for the maximization of (30) implies that
∂2W (0,S,y∗)
∂2y∗ − 2r
2
(r+y∗)3 < 0, i.e.,
∂G(S0,y∗)
∂y∗ < 0. Applying the implicit function theorem, we
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have:
∂y∗
∂S0
= −∂G(S0, y
∗)
∂S0
/
∂G(S0, y
∗)
∂y∗
.
It has been demonstrated in Appendix A3 that ∂
2W (0,S0,y)
∂y∂S0
> 0 holds for 0 ≤ S0 < S∞,
which implies ∂G(S0,y
∗)
∂S0
= ∂
2W (0,S0,y∗)
∂y∗∂S0
> 0. Since ∂G(S0,y
∗)
∂y∗ < 0 and
∂G(S0,y∗)
∂S0
> 0, one can
know that ∂y
∗
∂S0
= −∂G(S0,y∗)
∂S0
/∂G(S0,y
∗)
∂y∗ > 0, which implies that the optimal R&D effort
for the consumers’ coalition is an increasing function of the CO2 concentration level,
i.e., the higher the initial CO2 concentration level, the greater the optimal R&D effort.
The result suggests that the urgency to invest in R&D for stimulating innovation in
the carbon-free technology would be greater if the starting CO2 concentration level is
found to be higher. This reflects the fact that the innovation of the new technology,
which brings no emissions, would prevent the environment from being worsened by
further CO2 emissions from fossil fuels.
4.2 Global efficient R&D investment
The optimal R&D by the consumers’ coalition only takes into account its own welfare
and ignores the producers’ profits, which implies that it is not the global efficient R&D
investment. The achievement of global efficient R&D would require a global planner
rather than the consumers’ collation to make decisions on R&D investment. Specifi-
cally, the global planner will solve the following maximization problem to choose the
optimal R&D:
max
y≥0
M(0, S0, y)−
∫ +∞
0
e−rt[
∫ +∞
t
h(tI)dtI ]C(y)dt, (32)
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where M(0, S0, y) is the value function (evaluated at initial CO2 concentrationS(0) =
S0) for the global planner obtained in Section 2.3, which is a function of hazard rate
θ and thus a function of R&D effort y. The first order condition (interior solution)
implies:
∂M(0, S0, y)
∂y
=
y2 + 2ry
(r + y)2
. (33)
Similar to the case when the consumers’ coalition is making the R&D decision, if the
marginal benefit of R&D at y = 0 is greater than zero (i.e., ∂M(0,S0,y)
∂y
|y=0 > 0), one
can conclude that (with the satisfied second-order condition) a positive R&D effort is
worth exerting by the global planner. Since M(0, S0) = w0 + w1S0 + 12w2[S0]
2, where
m0,m1and m2 are functions of θ (θ ≡ y) as in Table 2, we can obtain∂M(0,S0,y)∂y |y=0 =
∂m0(y=0)
∂y
+ ∂m1(y=0)
∂y
S0 +
1
2
∂m2(y=0)
∂y
[S0]
2. It has been shown in Appendix B1 and B2 that
∂m2(θ=0)
∂θ
< 0and ∂m1(θ=0)
∂θ
> 0. Moreover, from the expression form0 in Table 2 and after
some calculations we have:
∂m0(y = 0)
∂y
= − b
2r2
[
rpic
r + b(c−m2|y=0)
]2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
b
r
[
rpic
r + b(c−m2|y=0)
]
∂m1(y = 0)
∂y︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
u¯
r2︸︷︷︸
>0
> − b
2r2
[
rpic
r + b(c−m2|y=0)
]2
+
u¯
r2
> − b
2r2
(pic)2 +
u¯
r2
.
Following similar reasoning to that of ∂w0(y=0)
∂y
> 0 if pN → 0, one can easily show
∂m0(y=0)
∂y
> 0 if pN → 0. That is, if the price of the carbon-free technology is sufficiently
low, ∂m0(y=0)
∂y
> 0 will hold.
Besides, one can easily verify that lim
y→+∞
∂m2
∂y
= 0, lim
y→+∞
∂m1
∂y
= 0, and lim
y→+∞
∂m0
∂y
= 0,
which implies that lim
y→+∞
∂M(0,S0,y)
∂y
= 0. Therefore, following a similar procedure as
that in the proof of Proposition 5 and making use of the results in Appendix B3 that
∂2M(0,S0,y)
∂y∂S0
|y=0 > 0 holds for all 0 ≤ S0 < S∞, we can show that it is also always optimal
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for a global planner to invest in R&D, if the price of new technology is sufficiently low,
and that the global efficient R&D investment (denoted as y∗∗) is an increasing function
of initial CO2 concentration as well.7
4.3 Consumers’ R&D VS global efficient R&D
We have known that it is always optimal to choose a positive R&D effort for both the
consumers’ coalition and a global planner, if the price of the new technology is suf-
ficiently low, and that the optimal R&D efforts for both of them should be larger if
the initial CO2 concentration level is higher. However, it might be of great interest to
investigate the relative magnitude of optimal R&D investment in the two cases. That
is, how large is the optimal R&D investment for the consumers’ coalition compared
with the global efficient investment? Recall from (31) and (33) that the marginal cost
function of the R&D investment is the same for the two cases. Therefore, we simply
need to compare the marginal benefit of R&D investment in the case where the con-
sumers’ coalition is making the R&D decision with that in the case where the global
planner makes the R&D decision instead. By doing this, the following proposition can
be established and demonstrated.
Proposition 6 If the environment damage is sufficiently high, the consumers’ coalition will
tend to over-invest in R&D for the new technology, compared with the global efficient invest-
ment.
Proof. Recall that the marginal benefit of R&D for the consumers’ coalition and the
global planner are ∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
= ∂w0
∂y
+ ∂w1
∂y
S0 +
1
2
∂w2
∂y
[S0]
2 and ∂M(0,S0,y)
∂y
= ∂m0
∂y
+ ∂m1
∂y
S0 +
7The proof is omitted to save space. The complete demonstration is available from the author upon
request.
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1
2
∂m2
∂y
[S0]
2 (where y is the R&D effort and we have hazard rate of innovation θ ≡ y),
respectively. The difference between these two is:
∂W (0, S0, y)
∂y
−∂M(0, S0, y)
∂y
=
(
∂w0
∂y
− ∂w0
∂y
)
+
(
∂w1
∂y
− ∂m1
∂y
)
S0+
1
2
(
∂w2
∂y
− ∂m2
∂y
)
[S0]
2.
It is not difficult to show after some calculations8 that as ε → +∞, we have ∂w0
∂y
→ u¯
r2
,
∂m0
∂y
→ u¯
r2
,∂w1
∂y
→ 0, ∂m1
∂y
→ 0 and ∂w2
∂y
− ∂m2
∂y
→ √ε · sign
(
b
r
√
2b(1+ y
r
)
− 2
3
b
r
√
6b(1+ y
r
)
)
→
+∞. This implies that we have ∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
− ∂M(0,S0,y)
∂y
→ +∞ as ε → +∞. That is, if
environmental damage ε is sufficiently high, we can have ∂W (0,S0,y)
∂y
− ∂M(0,S0,y)
∂y
> 0,
which implies that the marginal benefit of R&D for the consumers’ coalition will be
larger than that for the global planner. Based on the first order conditions (31) and
(33), it can be shown that the optimal R&D investment for the consumers’ coalition y∗
would be higher than the optimal investment for the global planner y∗∗, implying that
the consumers’ coalition can over-invest in R&D for the new technology, in the sense
that its investment is higher than the global efficient level.
This result is mainly due to the fact that the consumers’ coalition fails to take into ac-
count the effect of innovation on the producers’ profits when making its R&D decision
while the global planner needs to consider the producers’ profits in making its R&D
decision. Given that the innovation will eat all the profits of the producers, the global
planner might have some hesitation in investing the R&D for the new carbon-free
technology.
8Complete calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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5 Concluding remarks and discussion
This paper investigates the outcomes of the strategic interactions between a resource
consumers’ coalition and a producers’ cartel, taking into account the innovation on
a carbon-free technology through a dynamic game. Since the arrival time of inno-
vation is uncertain, both players need to make decisions under the expectation that
innovation could happen at any time in the future. With the expectation of possible
innovation, the consumer’ coalition chooses the optimal carbon taxation to maximize
consumers’ welfare, taking into account the externality of climate change, while the
producers’ cartel chooses its optimal (wellhead) energy pricing strategy to maximize
its profits. Based on the analytic solutions of the game, the effects of possible innova-
tion in the non-cooperative and cooperative cases are investigated, respectively. Be-
sides, the optimal R&D efforts that should be exerted by the consumers’ coalition and
by a global planner are characterized. Some important findings or policy implications
are summarized as follows.
The anticipation of innovation in cheap non-polluting resources will lower the initial
carbon tax, (wellhead) energy price, and consumer price, thereby stimulating a higher
initial demand for fossil fuels, and thus higher initial emissions. This is in line with
the ‘green paradox’ argument in the literature (e.g., Sinn, 2008) which states that it is
possible that the anticipation of a cheap non-polluting renewable resource will lead
fossil fuels owners to increase extraction and may have a detrimental effect on climate
change. Our results suggest that in the presence of strategic interactions or rent contest
between the resource consumers and producers this ‘green paradox’ effect still exists.
However, compared with the cooperative case where there is no strategic interactions
or rent contest, the ‘green paradox’ effect is found to be less dramatic in the presence of
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strategic interactions. This implies that the strategic interactions between the resource
consumers and producers can somewhat retain this ‘green paradox’ effect.
Regarding the optimal R&D efforts for innovation, it is found that if the price of the
new carbon-free technology is sufficiently low, it is in the best interest of both the
consumers’ coalition and a global planner to undertake R&D at any initial CO2 con-
centration level, which implies it will not be too late to start the R&D. Furthermore, the
optimal R&D investment should be an increasing function of the initial CO2 concentra-
tion level. That is, the higher the initial CO2 concentration level, the larger the optimal
R&D effort. However, the R&D investment made by the consumers’ coalition could be
higher than the global efficient level, if the environmental damage is sufficiently large.
The strategic interactions between the resource consumers’ carbon taxation and pro-
ducers’ energy pricing strategy can be very complex when incorporating the possible
innovation of carbon-free technologies. To simplify this issue, many assumptions have
been made in this paper. For instance, though the model presented here provides some
insights into the role of innovation and R&D in the strategic interactions of carbon tax-
ation and energy pricing, the R&D decision by the consumers’ coalition is not made
simultaneously with the decisions for carbon taxation. It would be interesting to ob-
tain both the Markovian strategy for R&D and the Markovian strategies for carbon
taxation and energy pricing at the same time, which of course is difficult to solve an-
alytically and may need the assistance of numerical methods. Besides, to reduce the
difficulty of finding the equilibrium, the climate module in the dynamic game here is
rather simple; in reality, the climate system can be very complex. It would be of great
interest to incorporate a more detailed climate module (e.g., a module that takes into
account climate sensitivity) into the current model, which could also be a direction for
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further research.
Appendix
A1.Proof of
∂z
∂θ
< 0
From the expression for zin Section 2 one can find its derivative with respect to the
hazard rate θ (θ ≥ 0) as: ∂z
∂θ
=
2
3b
(
1− 1
2
2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )
)
.
Let us suppose that 2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε
1
r√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )
≤ 2, which implies that:
[
2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε1r
]2 ≤ 4[(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )].
Calculating the square on the left-hand side and reordering terms, we have the con-
tradiction: 9b2c2 + 36b2( ε
r
)2 + 36b2cε1
r
≤ 0, which allows us to establish that:
2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )
> 2, i.e., 1− 1
2
2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )
< 0, thereby
making ∂z
∂θ
< 0 . One can verify that, as a special case, ∂z(θ = 0)
∂θ
< 0 (also denoted as
∂z
∂θ
|θ=0 < 0) will also hold.
A2.Proof of
∂x
∂θ
> 0
Taking the derivative of x with respect to the hazard rate of innovation θ (θ ≥ 0), after
some calculations, one can obtain (complete calculations are available upon request):
∂x
∂θ
=
8pic
[4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z)]2
(√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )−
r + θ
2
2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )
)
.
Let us suppose
√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr ) ≤
r + θ
2
2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )
,
which implies that (r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr ) ≤ (r + θ)2 + 32bc(r + θ) + 3bε(1 + θr ).
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Reordering terms we have the contradiction: 32bc(r + θ) + 3bε(1 +
θ
r ) ≤ 0, which allows us
to establish that
√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr ) >
r + θ
2
2(r + θ) + 3bc+ 6bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 3bc(r + θ) + 6bε(1 + θr )
,
and therefore we have: ∂x
∂θ
> 0. As a special case, ∂x(θ = 0)
∂θ
> 0 will hold as well.
A3. Proof of ∂
2W (0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
> 0 for 0 ≤ S0 < S∞
Since ∂W (0, S0, y)
∂y
=
∂w0
∂y
+
∂w1
∂y
S0 +
1
2
∂w2
∂y
[S0]
2, we have ∂
2W (0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
=
∂w1
∂y
+
∂w2
∂y
S0 =
∂(w1 + w2S0)
∂y
. Noting that w1 + w2S0 = (w1 + w2S∞) + w2(S0 − S∞) and being aware
of the relationship S∞ =
x+ pic
c− z , w1 =
1
3
x and w2 = z − 4ε
r
, one can obtain the following
relationship after some calculations: w1 + w2S0 = − 2pi
cε
rc+ 2ε
+ w2(S0 − S∞).
Therefore, we have ∂(w1 + w2S0)
∂y
=
∂w2
∂y
(S0 − S∞). Since ∂w2
∂y
=
1
3
∂z
∂y
< 0 (recall θ ≡ y and
see Appendix A1 for the proof of ∂z
∂θ
< 0), we have ∂
2W (0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
=
∂(w1 + w2S0)
∂y
> 0 for
S0 < S∞. And it is given that the initial CO2 concentration S0 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have
∂2W (0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
> 0 for all 0 ≤ S0 < S∞. As a special case, we have ∂
2W (0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
|y=0 > 0 for
0 ≤ S0 < S∞.
B1. Proof of
∂m2
∂θ
< 0
It is not difficult to find the derivative: ∂m2
∂θ
=
1
2b
(
1− 1
2
2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
)
.
Let us suppose that 2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε
1
r√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
≤ 2, which implies that:
(
2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε1r
)2 ≤ 4[(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )].
Calculating the square on the left-high side and reordering terms we have the contra-
diction: 16b2c2 + 64b2( ε
r
)2 + 64b2cε1
r
≤ 0, which allows us to establish that:
2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
≥ 2, i.e., 1− 1
2
2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
< 0, thereby
making ∂m2
∂θ
< 0
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B2. Proof of
∂m1
∂θ
> 0
Taking the derivative of m1 with respect to the hazard rate of innovation θ, and after
some calculations (which are available the author upon request), one can obtain: ∂m1
∂θ
=
pic
2[(r + θ) + b(c−m2)]2
(√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )−
r + θ
2
2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
)
.
Let us suppose
√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr ) ≤
r + θ
2
2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
,
which implies that (r+ θ)2 + 4bc(r+ θ) + 8bε(1 + θr ) ≤ (r+ θ)2 + 2(r+ θ)bc+ 4bε(1 + θr ). Re-
ordering terms we have the contradiction: 2bc(r+ θ) + 4bε(1 + θ
r
) ≤ 0, which allows us
to establish
√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr ) >
r + θ
2
2(r + θ) + 4bc+ 8bε 1r√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
, and
therefore we have: ∂m1
∂θ
> 0.
B3. Proof of ∂
2M(0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
> 0 for 0 ≤ S0 < S∞
Since
∂M(0, S0, y)
∂y
=
∂m0
∂y
+
∂m1
∂y
S0 +
1
2
∂m2
∂y
[S0]
2, we have
∂2M(0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
=
∂m1
∂y
+
∂m2
∂y
S0 =
∂(m1 +m2S0)
∂y
. Noting that m1 + m2S0 = (m1 + m2S∞) + m2(S0 − S∞) and being aware
of the relationship S∞ = SG∞ =
pic +m1
c−m2 , m1 =
(r + θ)pic
(r + θ) + b(c−m2) − pi
c and m2 = c+
1
2b
(
r + θ −√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θr )
)
, after some calculations, one can obtain: m1 + m2S0 =
− 2pi
cε
rc+ 2ε
+m2(S0 − S∞).
Therefore, we have
∂(m1 +m2S0)
∂y
=
∂m2
∂y
(S0 − S∞). Recalling θ ≡ y and ∂m2
∂θ
< 0 (see
Appendix B1), we have
∂2M(0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
=
∂(m1 +m2S0)
∂y
> 0 for S0 < S∞. It is given
that the initial CO2 concentration S0 ≥ 0. Therefore, we have ∂
2M(0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
> 0 for all
0 ≤ S0 < S∞. As a special case, we have ∂
2M(0, S0, y)
∂y∂S0
|y=0 > 0 for 0 ≤ S0 < S∞.
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Table 1. Coefficients for value functions W (0, S) and V (0, S)
w0 =
b
8(r + θ)
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z)
]2
+
θu¯
r(r + θ)
v0 =
b
4(r + θ)
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z)
]2
w1 =
1
3
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z) − pi
c
]
=
1
3
x v1 =
2
3
[
4(r + θ)pic
4(r + θ) + 3b(c− z) − pi
c
]
=
2
3
x
w2 =
1
3
[
z − 4ε
r
]
v2 =
2
3
[
z +
2ε
r
]
Table 2. Coefficients for value function M(0, S)
m0 =
b
2(r + θ)
[
(r + θ)pic
(r + θ) + b(c−m2)
]2
+
θu¯
r(r + θ)
m1 =
(r + θ)pic
(r + θ) + b(c−m2) − pi
c
m2 = c+
1
2b
(
r + θ −
√
(r + θ)2 + 4bc(r + θ) + 8bε(1 + θ
r
)
)
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Figure 1. Temporary trajectories for players’ strategies with/without the innovation possibility
